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Abstract
A simple and efficient protocol for quantum oblivious transfer is
proposed. The protocol can easily be implemented with present tech-
nology and is secure against cheaters with unlimited computing power
provided the receiver does not have the technology to store the par-
ticles for an arbitrarily long period of time. The proposed protocol
is a significant improvement over the previous protocols. Unlike the
protocol of Cre´peau and Kilian which is secure if only if the spin of
the particle is measured along the x or the y axis, the present protocol
is perfectly secure no matter along which axes the spin of the particles
are measured, and unlike the protocol of Bennett et al. which requires
tens of thousand of particles, the present protocol requires only two
particles.
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In 1970, Wiesner [1] wrote a highly innovative paper about quantum
cryptography [2], introducing a new branch of Physics and computation. In
his original paper, he also introduced the concept of Multiplexing, which was
later rediscovered by Rabin [3], and is now usually called Oblivious Transfer
(OT) [4]. The concept of OT has turned out to be a very useful tool in
designing cryptographic protocols, and has been used for quite a while as
a standard primitive tool for constructing more complex protocols. Let us
briefly describe the OT protocol:
1 - Alice knows one bit λ, where λ is either 1 or −1 [5].
2 - Bob obtains bit λ from Alice with probability 0.5.
3 - Bob knows whether or not he obtained bit λ.
4 - Alice does not learn whether or not Bob obtained bit λ.
Cre´peau and Kilian [6] have suggested that OT can simply be achieved
by having Alice send Bob a single spin 12 particle, for example an electron,
encoding the OT bit into the spin of the particle along the horizontal or
vertical axis (or encoding the OT bit in polarization of the photon along
the horizontal or diagonal axis). Bob then randomly chooses the x or the
y axis, and measures the spin of the particle along that axis. Finally Alice
tells Bob the correct axis. This simple protocol is secure if and only if Bob
measures the spin of the particle along the horizontal or the vertical axis. For
example if Bob measures the spin of the particle along the diagonal axis, he
will then obtain a considerable amount of partial information about Alice’s
bit [6]. Bennett et al. [7] have proposed a protocol for quantum OT which is
free from this disadvantage; but their protocol is rather inefficient, requiring
tens of thousands of particles to be sent and received for a simple decision
making. It is worth noting that all previous quantum oblivious protocols are
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insecure against EPR attack.
In this paper, we propose a simple and efficient protocol for quantum
OT. The protocol is a considerable improvement over the previous protocols.
Unlike the protocol of Bennett et al., the present protocol requires only two
particles to be sent for a simple decision making, and unlike the protocol
of Cre´peau and Kilian, the proposed protocol is perfectly secure no matter
along which axes the spin of the particles are measured.
The proposed protocol consists of the following steps:
(1) Alice and Bob agree that λ is encoded in the product of the spin of
the two particles along the horizontal axis or along the vertical axis, i.e.,
λ is encoded in b1b2, where b1 and b2 are spins of the first and the second
particles along the horizontal axis, or b1 and b2 are spins of the first and the
second particles along the vertical axis (here horizontal axis refers to x or −x
axes and vertical axis refers to y or −y axes). They also agree that b1 = 1
(b2 = 1) indicates that spin of the first (second) particle is along 0 or
π
2
axis,
and b1 = −1 (b2 = −1) indicates that spin of the first (second) particle is
along π or
3π
2
axis. For example if λ = 1, and if Alice decides to encode λ in
the product of the spin of the two particles along the horizontal axis, then
she prepares two particles with their spins along the x axis, or two particles
with their spins along the −x axis. Similarly if λ = −1, and if Alice decides
to encode λ in the product of the spin of the two particles along the vertical
axis, then she prepares two particles with spin of the first particle along the
y axis and spin of the second particle along the −y axis or spin of the the
first particle along the −y axis and spin of the second particle along the y
axis.
(2) Alice encodes λ in b1b2 and sends Bob the two particles.
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(3) Bob measures the spin of both particles randomly along the x axis or
along the y axis.
(4) Alice asks Bob if his measurements have been successful. If Bob says no,
then Alice goes to step 2. If Bob says yes, then Alice tells him only one of
the following two alternatives:
(i) λ is encoded in the product of the spin of the two particles along the
horizontal axis,
(ii) λ is encoded in the product of the spin of the two particles along the
vertical axis,
We now show that if Bob does not have the technology to store the parti-
cles until step 4, then the above oblivious transfer protocol is secure against
cheaters with unlimited computing power. First note that if Bob is honest,
then the oblivious transfer protocol can succeed without any difficulty. For
example, assume λ is encoded in the product of the spin of the two particles
along the horizontal axis. If Bob measures the spins of the particles along
the x axis, then he learns the value of λ; but if he measures the spins of the
particles along the y axis, then he does not gain any information about λ.
Now consider a cheating Bob who measures the spin of the first particle
along axis ~a at angle α with respect to the x axis, and measures the spin of
the second particle along axis ~b at angle β with respect to the x axis. The
result of his measurement on the first photon can be represented by a random
variable b′
1
which takes values in the set {1,−1}. According to the standard
rules of quantum theory
p (b′
1
= b1) = cos
2
(
α− θ
2
)
, p (b′
1
= −b1) = sin
2
(
α− θ
2
)
, (1)
where θ is the angle at which the spin of the first particle is measured by
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Alice and is in the set
{
0,
π
2
, π,
3π
2
}
. Similarly the result of his measurement
on the second photon can be represented by a random variable b′
2
taking
values in the set {1,−1}. Again according to quantum theory
p (b′
2
= 1 | b2 = 1) = cos
2
(
β − φ
2
)
, p (b′
2
= −1 | b2 = −1) = cos
2
(
β − φ
2
)
,
p (b′
2
= 1 | b2 = −1) = sin
2
(
β − φ
2
)
, p (b′
2
= −1 | b2 = 1) = sin
2
(
β − φ
2
)
,
(2)
where φ is the angle at which the spin of the first particle is measured by by
Alice and is in the set
{
0,
π
2
, π,
3π
2
}
.
Without loss of generality, first we assume λ = 1. We now asks the
following question: Given that λ = 1, what is the probability that Bob will
obtain λ′ = 1, i.e., what is p (λ′ = 1 | λ = 1)? To answere this question,
we note that λ is encoded along the horizontal and vertical axes with equal
probability, i.e.,
p (λ′ = 1 | λ = 1) = p (b′
1
b′
2
= 1 | b1b2 = 1)
= p (H) p (b′
1
b′
2
= 1 | b1b2 = 1, H)
+ p (V ) p (b′
1
b′
2
= 1 | b1b2 = 1, V ) , (3)
where H means λ is encoded along the horizontal axis and V means λ is
encoded along the vertical axis. We now note that
p (b′
1
b′
2
= 1 | b1b2 = 1, H) = p (b1 = 1, b2 = 1) p (b
′
1
b′
2
= 1 | b1 = 1, b2 = 1, H)
+ p (b1 = −1, b2 = −1) p (b
′
1
b′
2
= 1 | b1 = −1, b2 = −1, H) ,
p (b′
1
b′
2
= 1 | b1b2 = 1, V ) = p (b1 = 1, b2 = 1) p (b
′
1
b′
2
= 1 | b1 = 1, b2 = 1, V )
+ p (b1 = −1, b2 = −1) p (b
′
1
b′
2
= 1 | b1 = −1, b2 = −1, V ) .
(4)
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Since Alice encodes λ along x and −x with equal probability,
p (b1 = −1, b2 = −1) =
1
2
, p (b1 = 1, b2 = 1) =
1
2
, (5)
we thus have
p (b′
1
b′
2
= 1 | b1b2 = 1, H) =
1
2
p (b′
1
= 1 | b1 = 1, H) p (b
′
2
= 1 | b2 = 1, H)
+
1
2
p (b′
1
= 1 | b1 = −1, H) p (b
′
2
= 1 | b2 = −1, H)
+
1
2
p (b′
1
= −1 | b1 = 1, H) p (b
′
2
= −1 | b2 = 1, H)
+
1
2
p (b′
1
= −1 | b1 = −1, H) p (b
′
2
= −1 | b2 = −1, H)
=
1
2
[
cos2
(
α
2
)
cos2
(
β
2
)
+ sin2
(
α
2
)
sin2
(
β
2
)
+ sin2
(
α
2
)
sin2
(
β
2
)
+ cos2
(
α
2
)
cos2
(
β
2
)]
.
(6)
Similarly
p (b′
1
b′
2
= 1 | b1b2 = 1, V ) =
1
2
p (b′
1
= 1 | b1 = 1, V ) p (b
′
2
= 1 | b2 = 1, V )
+
1
2
p (b′
1
= 1 | b1 = −1, V ) p (b
′
2
= 1 | b2 = −1, V )
+
1
2
p (b′
1
= −1 | b1 = 1, V ) p (b
′
2
= −1 | b2 = 1, V )
+
1
2
p (b′
1
= −1 | b1 = −1, V ) p (b
′
2
= −1 | b2 = −1, V )
=
1
2
[
cos2
(
α
2
−
π
4
)
cos2
(
β
2
−
π
4
)
+ sin2
(
α
2
−
π
4
)
sin2
(
β
2
−
π
4
)
+ sin2
(
α
2
−
π
4
)
sin2
(
β
2
−
π
4
)
+ cos2
(
α
2
−
π
4
)
cos2
(
β
2
−
π
4
) ]
.
(7)
Using Eqs. (3), (6) and (7), and noting that p (H) = p (V ) = 12, we obtain
p (λ′ = 1 | λ = 1) =
1
2
[
cos2
(
α
2
)
cos2
(
β
2
)
+ sin2
(
α
2
)
sin2
(
β
2
)
+cos2
(
α
2
−
π
4
)
cos2
(
β
2
−
π
4
)
+ sin2
(
α
2
−
π
4
)
sin2
(
β
2
−
π
4
)]
.
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Using the following simple trigonometric relations,
cos (γ1 − γ2) = cos γ1 cos γ2 + sin γ1 sin γ2,
sin (2γ) = 2 sin γcosγ, cos2 γ =
1 + cos(2γ)
2
, (8)
Eq. (7) may be simplified to
p (λ′ = 1 | λ = 1) =
1
2
+
1
4
(cos α cos β + sin α sin β)
=
1
2
+
1
4
cos (α− β) . (9)
Obviously
p (λ′ = −1 | λ = 1) = 1− p (λ′ = 1 | λ = 1)
=
1
2
−
1
4
cos (α− β) . (10)
The probability that λ′ = 1 (λ′ = −1) given that λ = 1 is maximized
(minimized) if α = β and the maximum (minimum) value is
3
4
(
1
4
)
. Thus
the best strategy for a cheating Bob is to measure the spin of both particles
along the same axis, in which case he would obtain as much information as
an honest Bob who measures the spin of both particles along the x or along
the y axis, i.e., a cheating Bob can not gain any more information about λ
than an honest Bob.
Next we assume that λ = −1. We now ask the following question:
Given that λ = −1, what is the probability that λ′ = 1, i.e., what is
p (λ′ = 1 | λ = −1)? To answere this question, again we note that λ is en-
coded along the horizontal and vertical axes with equal probability, i.e.,
p (λ′ = 1 | λ = −1) = p (b′
1
b′
2
= 1 | b1b2 = −1)
= p (H) p (b′
1
b′
2
= 1 | b1b2 = −1, H)
+ p (V ) p (b′
1
b′
2
= 1 | b1b2 = −1, V ) . (11)
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We now note that
p (b′
1
b′
2
= 1 | b1b2 = −1, H) = p (b1 = 1, b2 = −1) p (b
′
1
b′
2
= 1 | b1 = 1, b2 = −1, H)
+ p (b1 = −1, b2 = 1) p (b
′
1
b′
2
= 1 | b1 = −1, b2 = −1, H) ,
p (b′
1
b′
2
= 1 | b1b2 = −1, V ) = p (b1 = 1, b2 = −1) p (b
′
1
b′
2
= 1 | b1 = 1, b2 = −1, V )
+ p (b1 = −1, b2 = 1) p (b
′
1
b′
2
= 1 | b1 = −1, b2 = 1, V ) .
(12)
Since Alice encodes λ along x and −x with equal probability,
p (b1 = 1, b2 = −1) =
1
2
, p (b1 = −1, b2 = 1) =
1
2
, (13)
we thus have
p (b′
1
b′
2
= 1 | b1b2 = −1, H) =
1
2
p (b′
1
= 1 | b1 = 1, H) p (b
′
2
= 1 | b2 = −1, H)
+
1
2
p (b′
1
= −1 | b1 = 1, H) p (b
′
2
= −1 | b2 = −1, H)
+
1
2
p (b′
1
= 1 | b1 = −1, H) p (b
′
2
= 1 | b2 = 1, H)
+
1
2
p (b′
1
= −1 | b1 = −1, H) p (b
′
2
= −1 | b2 = 1, H)
=
1
2
[
cos2
(
α
2
)
sin2
(
β
2
)
+ sin2
(
α
2
)
cos2
(
β
2
)
+ sin2
(
α
2
)
cos2
(
β
2
)
+ cos2
(
α
2
)
sin2
(
β
2
)]
.
(14)
Similarly
p (b′
1
b′
2
= 1 | b1b2 = −1, V ) =
1
2
p (b′
1
= 1 | b1 = 1, V ) p (b
′
2
= 1 | b2 = −1, V )
+
1
2
p (b′
1
= −1 | b1 = 1, V ) p (b
′
2
= −1 | b2 = −1, V )
+
1
2
p (b′
1
= 1 | b1 = −1, V ) p (b
′
2
= 1 | b2 = 1, V )
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+
1
2
p (b′
1
= −1 | b1 = −1, V ) p (b
′
2
= −1 | b2 = 1, V )
=
1
2
[
cos2
(
α
2
−
π
4
)
sin2
(
β
2
−
π
4
)
+ sin2
(
α
2
−
π
4
)
cos2
(
β
2
−
π
4
)
+ sin2
(
α
2
−
π
4
)
cos2
(
β
2
−
π
4
)
+ cos2
(
α
2
−
π
4
)
sin2
(
β
2
−
π
4
)]
.
(15)
Again using the fact that p (H) = p (V ) =
1
2
and referring to Eqs. (11), (14),
and (15), we have
p (λ′ = −1 | λ = −1) =
1
2
[
cos2
(
α
2
)
sin2
(
β
2
)
+ sin2
(
α
2
)
cos2
(
β
2
)
+cos2
(
α
2
−
π
4
)
sin2
(
β
2
−
π
4
)
+ sin2
(
α
2
−
π
4
)
cos2
(
β
2
−
π
4
)]
(16)
Simplifying the above equation, we obtain
p (λ′ = 1 | λ = −1) =
1
2
−
1
4
(cos α cos β − sin α sin β)
=
1
2
−
1
4
cos (α− β) . (17)
Obviously
p (λ′ = −1 | λ = −1) = 1− p (λ′ = 1 | λ = −1)
=
1
2
+
1
4
cos (α− β) . (18)
The probability that λ′ = 1 (λ′ = −1) given that λ = −1 is minimized
(maximized) if α = β and the minimum (maximum) value is
1
4
(
3
4
)
. Thus
the best strategy for a cheating Bob is to measure the spin of both particles
along the same axis, in which case he would obtain as much information as
an honest Bob who measures the spin of both particles along the x or along
the y axis. Finally it should be noted that Bob can cheat by storing the
particles until step 4 and then perform his measurements. This sophisticated
9
attack, which is in principle possible, is completely infeasible at present or in
the foreseeable future.
To summarize, a cryptographic protocol for quantum OT is proposed.
The protocol is a significant improvement over the previous protocols. Un-
like the protocol of Kilian and Cre´peau which is secure if and only if the spin
of the particles are measured along the horizontal or vertical axis, the present
protocol is secure no matter along which axis the spin of the particles are
measured, and unlike the protocol of Bennett et al. which requires tens of
thousand of photons, the present protocol requires only two photons. How-
ever, similar to previous protocols, the present protocol is not secure against
EPR attack. The advantage of the present protocol is that it is extremely
simple, highly economical and is secure against cheater with technology that
is available today or in foreseeable future.
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